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PEOPLE V. KELLUM

[Crim. No. 13271.

In Bank.

[71 C.2d

June 18, 1969.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WENDELL
KELt Ul\1:, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Reversible Error-Evidence--Admissions.-Reversal of defendant's conviction of rape and assault
with intent to commit rape was required,where prejudicial
admissions introduced against him at his trial were obtained in
violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rules, where defendant's
trial was held prior to Escobedo but entry of judgment was
postponed by his commitment pursuant to sexual psychopathy
proceedings under fo"rmer Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5500 et seq.,
where defendant was subsequently found to be not amena.ble"
to treatment and was sentenced to· imprisonment, where he
was seeking Rppellate review of his conviction for the first
time, and where defendant was in no way to· blame for the
delay in the finality of the judgment against him (disapprov- .
ing to the extent it is inconsistent herewith, People v. W.lliams (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 951 [71 Cal.Rptr. 871]).

APPEAL -from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County and from orders of commitment. Redmond C.
Staats, Jr., and Leonard Dieden,Judges. Judgment reversed;
orders vacated.
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape and for
forcible rape. Judgment of conviction reversed.
-Lloyd B. Egenes, under appointment by the SupremeCourt,for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, RobertR. Granucci"
and Michael Buzzell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In 1963 a jury found defendant guilty
of one count of assault with intent to commit rape (Pen.
Code, § 220) and one count of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261,
subd. 4). Before sentencing, the court adjourned the criminal
)

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Evidence, § 496; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence,
§ 555.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Criminal Law, § 1382.1(0.5).
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proceedings and instituted sexual psychopathy! proceedings.
(Welf. &. Inst. Code, § 5500 et seq.) Pursuant to such proceedings, defendant was committed to Atascadero State Hospital.
In June 1967 the court held a hearing and found "that the
defendant ·is still a mentally disordered sex offender and not
amenable to treatment." It thereupon reinstituted the criminal proceedings and in November 1967 sentenced defendant to
imprisonment .for the term prescribed by law. Defendant.
appeals.
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Defendant contends that at his trial prejudicial admissions
were introduced against him that were obtained in violation
of the rules subsequently announced in Escobedo v. Illinois
(1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758] and
People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rpt.r. 169, 398
P.2d 361]. Since we have held that those rules apply to all
cases not final before Escobedo was decided on June 2.2, 1964
(Pepple v. Rollins (1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 691 [56 Cal.Rptr.
293,423 P .2d 221] ; In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 372: [42
Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380] ; In re Shipp (19'65) 62 Cal.2d
547,549 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571]), defendant concludes
that the judgment must be reversed. The Attorney General
contends that cases such as this one, which was tried before
Escobedo but in which entry of judgment was postponed
owing to a conmlitment under the provisions of the 'Velfare
and Institutions Code, should be treated as exceptions to the
rule of the Lopez case. He points out that such an exception is
permissible under the holding in Johnson .v. NeW' Jersey
(1966) 384 U.S. 719 [16 L.Ed.2d 882:, 86 S.Ct. 1772:], that
·--·statecourts are not constitutionally compelledto~applyEsco
bedo to cases in which trial commenced before June 22, 1964.
He invokes People v. Rivers (1967) 66. Cal.2d 1000 [59' Cal.
Rptr. 851, 429 P.2d 171] in which we held that Escobedo and
Dorado are not applicable to cases in which the judgments
became final before Escobedo was decided under then existing
appellate procedures but in which remittiturs were recalled
after Escobedo to meet evolving standards of representation
of counsel on appeal.
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proceedings are now called mentally disordered sex offender pro-

('~('dll1gs. The article definillg alld describing the disposition of mentan~T

dIsordered sex offenders, formerly. codified as 'Welfare and Institutio1l8
Code sections 5500-5522, has been )'ecodified as \Velfare and Institutions
Code sections 6300-6330. The section numbers appearing in the text conform to the old classification.
71 C.2d-12
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[1] 'Ve believe that the controlling decision is not Rivers
but Rollins. 2 In Rollins, we squarely confronted the question
whether in view of J onnson we should continue to apply
Escobedo and Dorado to pending appeals in cases tried before
Escobedo. We determined that we should. We pointed out
that our application of Escobedo to all cases still pending on
direct review when Escobedo was decided was consistent with
the settled law before J ohnson ~as decided, that to continue
to so apply Escobedo would impose no major burden on the
administration of justice, and that to cease do~ng so. would
give rise to wholly arbitrary inequalities. "The vast majority
of cases in California which had not become final prior to
June 22, 1964, have by this time been disposed of on appeal in
accordance with the teaching of Escobedo and Dorado. Accordingly, we need not invite the anomalies and the manifest
injustice which the rejection of. Lopez, at the virtual end of
its natural life, would entail. Thus . . . we adhere to .Lopez
in applying Escobedo and Dorado to the instant case and to
all other cases which had not become final before· June 22,
1964." (People v. Rollins, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 691.)
Defendant is a member of the precise class we deemed
entitled to protection from arbitrary discrimination in Rollins, namely, those tried before Escobedo whose convictions
,vere still subject to review when J onnson was decided. .
Defendant is in no way to blame for the delay in the finality
of the judgment against him, for that delay was, until the
1968 amendment to P~nal Code section 1237, inherent in the
statutory provisions governing ,commitment and appellate
procedures. (P~ople v. Gonzales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 467, 471 [67
----.---~-~ Cal.Rptr.551, 439P.2d 655].) -Finally, to deny persons -suchas defendant the benefit of Escobedo would create additional
discriminations within the class to which h~ belongs. Thus,
those tried before Escobedo but against whom no judgment
was entered until after J onnson would receive the benefit of
Escobedo if they had the foresight to invoke Escobedo on
motion for new trial or on appeal from the denial of such a
motion during the interval bet.ween Escobedo and J ohnson~
but would be denied the benefit of Escobedo if they elected
instead, while rehabilitative treatment continued, not to challenge the validity of their convictions until appealable judgments were entered against them. People v. Gonzales, supra, .
forbids such discrimination;
There is nothing in Rivers contrary to our conclusion
2To the extent that People v. Williams (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 951
[71 Cal.Rptr. 871], is contrary to our decision herein it is disapproved.
-
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herein. In that case we were concerned with defendants who
had exhausted allavenues of appellate review before Escobedo
was decided and whose judgments would have remained final
but for the decision in Douglas v. Oalifornia (1963) 372 U.S.
353 [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 S.Ct. 814], requiring representation of
counsel on appeal. Those defendants were not part of the
class considered in. Rollins; namely, those tried before Escobedo whose judgments were never reviewed on appeal until
after J ohmon. They represented a separate category that
threatened to be of _significant quantity. Considerations of
equality also dictated that they should be treated, not as
though their appeals had never been decided, but according to
the law applicable when their first appeals were decided.
Otherwise, "the indigent defendant' deprived of counsel
anomalously would find himself possessed of more shafts in
his quiver than would have been the case had he been able to
afford to properly arm himself in the first instance." (People
v. Garner (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 212, 215-216, fn. 1 [44 Cal.
Rptr. 217].) Moreover, allowing such defendants to invoke
Escobedo as a byproduct of Douglas would have involved the
serious difficulties of retrials long after the events involved
had occurred. In the present case, defendant is seeking appellate review of his conviction for the first time. Allowing him
to invoke Escobedo affords him no "more shafts in his
quiver" than he would have had if he had raised Escobedo
by motion for new trial soon after it was decided. The difficulties of a belated retrial arise, not from the reopening of an
apparently final judgment,but from the statutory provisions
that provided for appeals from judgments that need not have
been entered until long after the underlying convictions on
which they were based.
Although defendant is no longer being held pursuant to the
temporary and indefinite orders committing him to Atascadero, he is entitled to challenge those orders to clear his
record. (People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 789-790 [63
Cal.Rptr. 569, 433 P.2d 473].) Since a valid commitment must
be based upon a valid conviction (In re Bevill (1968) 68
Cal.2d 854, 862-863 [69 Cal.Rptr. 599, 442· P.2d 679] ; Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 5501), the orders of commitment must be
vacated.
The orders committing defendant to Atascadero State Hospital are vacated. The judgment is reversed.
l\fcComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J" concurr:ed.

